In foreign policy, good ideas often emerge from bad decisions. The Powell Doctrine, a term typically associated with the American triumph over Iraq in the 1990-91 Gulf War, did not originate with Colin Powell. The doctrine’s roots lay in a disaster in Lebanon, according to Kori Schake in a recent Foreign Affairs article.
In 1982, a rift opened inside the Reagan administration over contributing U.S. troops to a multinational force in Lebanon. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger feared an ill-defined mission would drag the United States into an escalatory spiral. The hawks won the debate, but Weinberger’s fears were realized when militants linked to Hezbollah killed 241 U.S. service members in October 1983.
Weinberger delivered a speech in November 1984 declaring that any plan to use military force should pass six tests. Vital national interests must be at stake. Washington must commit the resources to achieve victory. Policymakers must have clearly defined objectives. They must continually reassess deployments. They must gain the support of the American people and Congress. Finally, combat should be a last resort.
Powell added two conditions to his former boss’s list: a clear exit strategy and international support. Powell wanted to ensure military force was rarely employed and part of a strategy that integrated other elements of national power. The Powell Doctrine faced its first real test in 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait.
The doctrine’s influence began to wane long ago, but no administration truly repudiated it — at least until President Donald Trump’s second term. Trump launched a war on Iran without clearly delineated objectives, without consulting Congress or U.S. allies, without an authorization for the use of military force, without exhausting diplomacy and without an exit strategy.
The Trump administration made a reasonable case that it would be damaging for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. By mid-2025, Iran was getting closer. The United States joined Israel in a bombardment of Iranian nuclear facilities. The so-called 12-day war ended with a cease-fire. It had at least a clear objective, decisive military force and an exit strategy.
Trump’s decision to resume hostilities in February passed none of the Powell Doctrine’s tests. Trump recited a litany of Iranian infractions and suggested a number of objectives in pre-taped remarks posted to social media just before 3 AM on February 28. The sheer number of objectives obscured clarity. Many were unattainable with the resources committed, especially given the administration’s self-imposed prohibition on deploying ground forces.
The administration failed to build public and congressional support. Only 35 percent of Americans supported the war when it started and 47 percent opposed it. By mid-July, support fell slightly and opposition rose to 58 percent. In June, both houses of Congress passed resolutions calling for an end to the war — the first time that has happened since the War Powers Act came into force in 1973.
The lack of commitment to victory is related to the lack of an exit strategy. After the cease-fire collapsed, U.S. targeting expanded to civilian infrastructure, precipitating escalating Iranian attacks on energy and desalination facilities across the region. Iran successfully weathered the military attacks and proved its previously hypothetical ability to control the Strait of Hormuz.
The Trump administration is unlikely to be chastened by its failure in Iran. The administration will likely continue sporadic standoff strikes and pursue negotiations aimed at restoring a cease-fire. Adherence to the Powell Doctrine could have prevented those losses and could still help chart a way out.
Congress holds the power of the purse. Schake argues Congress should stipulate that it will not authorize further funding until the administration presents a plan that passes the Powell Doctrine’s tests. As Powell wrote in his 1995 memoir: “Many of my generation vowed that when our turn came to call the shots, we would not quietly acquiesce in halfhearted warfare for half-baked reasons that the American people could not understand.” That is precisely the kind of warfare Trump has undertaken.
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